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ABSTRACT:  
Based on a model of behavioural response to taxes, and using the Taxpayers Panel of 
the Institute of Fiscal Studies for the period 1999-2009, we analyse whether the dual 
nature of the Spanish Personal Income Tax (PIT), reinforced by the reform of the year 
2007, has influenced taxpayers’ behaviour, causing them to convert part of their 
“general income” (from labor, real estate or economic activities) into “savings income” 
(from movable capital or capital gains). We also extend the analysis of income shifting 
and study whether Spanish taxpayers also responded to the different tax treatment given 
to the two types of savings income (movable capital and capital gains) until 2007, 
transforming savings income from one type to another. The results of our study 
demonstrate three facts. First, Spanish taxpayers did respond to the different tax rates, 
shifting income from the general base to different forms of savings, especially capital 
gains. The highest-income individuals and the self-employed and business owners are 
the groups where this behaviour was most marked. Second, self-employed and business 
owners also turned income from movable assets into capital gains, guided by their 
different tax rates. And third, we have found signs of “anticipation” and “learning” 
effects caused by the 2007 tax reform. We believe that the results obtained will enrich 
the growing literature on income shifting. 
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POLICY POINTS: 
•    Dual income taxes, which tax savings income at lower rates than general income, 
encourage an income shifting strategy which has hardly been studied by the applied 
literature. 
•    Spanish PIT taxpayers plan the composition of their taxable base according to the 
taxation of each income source in three ways. They shift part of their revenues from the 
general base to that of savings, especially capital gains. They shift income from capital 
income to capital gains. And they shift income over time. 
•    Self-employed and business owners and higher-income individuals are the ones who 
most use these tax planning strategies. 
•    All these strategies generate inefficiencies and erode the progressivity of the tax 
system and revenue collection, and thus they must be taken into account when 
designing taxes. 
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1. Introduction 
A widespread practice of recent years in the majority of OECD countries is the adoption 
of specific treatments for capital income under synthetic income taxes. Despite the 
advantages the literature associates with dual income taxes (Boadway, 2004; Sørensen, 
2005), in the Nordic countries, which have more than 20 years’ experience in the field, 
there is a growing concern that a dual tax may incentivise tax avoidance through income 
shifting between tax bases. The different tax rates which can be applied to income 
depending on how it is obtained, as earned income or as capital income, mean that 
individuals are tempted to shift part of their returns from the general base to the capital 
base, in order to take advantage of a more favorable tax. This generates inefficiencies 
and erodes the progressivity of the tax system, and has caused the Nordic countries to 
adopt certain measures to avoid this behaviour, such as the distribution of business 
income between the tax base of labor and the tax base of capital. 
Spanish Personal Income Tax (henceforth, PIT) has traditionally applied a lower tax 
rate to capital gains. Since 2007, this treatment extends to movable capital income. The 
aim of this paper is to analyse whether the dual nature of the PIT has influenced 
taxpayers’ behaviour, causing them to convert part of their “general income” (from 
labor, real estate or economic activities) into “savings income” (from movable capital or 
capital gains). The options are varied. We will examine three examples. First, if 
employees are paid in kind in the form of company shares, up to a set limit, this 
payment in kind is exempt from PIT, and future returns on the shares will be taxed as 
savings income. Second, the self-employed and business owners can finance an 
investment with external resources and deduct the financial expenses, thereby reducing 
their general taxable income, and invest their own funds in savings income, which will 
be taxed at lower rates. And third, if the individuals invest in movable assets rather than 
real estate, they will pay lower taxes, given that income from the former is savings 
income, and from the latter, general income. In this paper we also extend the analysis of 
income shifting and study whether Spanish taxpayers also responded to the different tax 
treatment given to the two types of savings income (movable capital and capital gains) 
until 2007, transforming savings income from one type to another. This aspect has not 
been previously analysed in the literature.   
The empirical exercise is performed using the Spanish Taxpayers Panel of the Institute 
of Fiscal Studies (IEF) for the period 1999-2009. The results of our study demonstrate 
4 
 
three facts. First, Spanish taxpayers did respond to the different tax rates, shifting 
income from the general base to different forms of savings, especially capital gains. The 
highest-income individuals and the self-employed and business owners are the groups 
where this behaviour was most marked. Second, self-employed and business owners 
also turned income from movable assets into capital gains, guided by their different tax 
rates. And third, we have found signs of “anticipation” and “learning” effects caused by 
the 2007 tax reform. We believe that the results obtained will enrich the growing 
literature on income shifting.  
Related literature. Studies of income shifting between bases have focused on several 
issues: The form of organisation chosen by entrepreneurs (as Gordon and MacKie-
Mason, 1994, and Gordon and Slemrod, 2000, for the USA; Domínguez-Barrero et al., 
2005, for Spain; De Mooij and Nicodème, 2008, for several European countries; and 
Thoresen and Alstadsaeter, 2010, for Norway); the choice of remuneration regime for 
business owners (such as Kari, 1999; Fjaerli and Lun, 2001; Lindhe et al., 2002 and 
2004; Alstadsaeter and Jacob, 2016; and Harju and Matikka, 2016 a and 2016 b, for the 
Nordic countries); and income shifting between spouses (as in Stephens and Ward-
Batts, 2004, for the UK).  
Studies of income shifting over time have focused on when dividends are paid out 
(Chetty and Saez, 2005, for the USA; Kari et al, 2008, for Finland; Jacob and Jacob, 
2012, for 25 OCDE countries; le Maire and Schjerning, 2013, for Denmark) and, above 
all, on when capital gains are realised (notable works include studies of the USA by 
Poterba, 1987; Auerbach et al., 1998; Reese, 1998; Poterba and Weisbenner, 2001; 
Ivkovíc et al., 2005; and Dai et al., 2008; and the more recent work of Daunfeldt et al., 
2010, and Jacob, 2016a, for Sweden).1 This last research avenue has proliferated in the 
last two decades and provides sufficient empirical evidence of the “lock-in” effect 
which high tax rates provoke in capital gains.   
However, income shifting between tax bases of the PIT has hardly been studied 
empirically and is unknown in Spain, where only the theoretical contributions of 
Domínguez-Barrero and López-Laborda (2003, 2008) are to be found.2 Sørensen (2010) 
performs an interesting theoretical analysis of the question for the Nordic countries and, 
                                                            
1  See the recent surveys about income shifting by Saez et al. (2012) and Alstadsæter and Jacob (2012). 
2 A very preliminary approach to the problem which concerns us in this study can be found in Moreno-
Cepas (2012). 
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as far as we are aware, Pirttilä and Selin (2011) are the only authors to provide 
empirical evidence on this phenomenon. They studied Finland’s 1993 tax reform, which 
lowered marginal taxes on capital income for some, but not all, taxpayers. For that 
reason, their work analyses the different responses of a treatment group (self-employed) 
and a control group (employees) to the introduction of a dual tax which taxed all 
savings income neutrally, finding evidence that the self-employed shifted income from 
the general base to the savings base.  
Thanks to the richness of information in the database we worked with, and to the fact 
that the changes in tax rates of the 2007 reform made tax planning feasible for all 
Spanish taxpayers, whatever their income level, we were able to use a different scenario 
and methodology than Pirttilä and Selin (2011) to study these questions. The Spanish 
tax reform is therefore particularly suitable for examining the impacts of a dual tax 
reform, and lets us offer richer results than those obtained in Pirttilä and Selin (2011). 
Our article also relates closely to the line of research cited above, which analyses the 
choice of remuneration regime for business owners (wages or dividends), especially the 
work of Harju and Matikka (2016a). These authors analyse income shifting in a very 
similar way to our approach here, using the tax rate differential between wages and 
dividends to measure income shifting between them after the 2005 reform in Finland. 
Outline of the paper. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present 
the model of behavioural responses to taxes which constitutes the theoretical basis of 
our research. The third section describes the evolution of the taxation of general and 
savings income in the Spanish PIT since 1999, and how the reform of 2007 introduced 
new incentives to shift income between the two bases. In this section we also analyse 
the fiscal data supplied by the Ministry of Public Finance and Public Administrations 
(MINHAP); these already provide clues concerning some taxpayers’ tax planning 
strategies, which we shall subsequently test empirically. In the fourth section we 
describe the model which we shall estimate, the dependent and independent variables 
and the database employed, and in the fifth section we explain the estimations 
performed and discuss the main obtained results. The paper concludes with a section of 
final considerations. 
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2. The model 
To analyse the incentives for taxpayers to decide the composition of their income based 
on the different taxes charged on its components, we will extend a simple static model 
of income shifting developed by Piketty and Saez (2013), Piketty et al. (2014) and 
Harju and Matikka (2016a).3 
Individual i obtains general income,  ݖ௚ (e.g., labor income) and two types of savings 
income: movable capital income, ݖ௠௖ (e.g., dividends and interests) and capital gains, 
ݖ௖௚. General income is subject to a tax rate ݐ௚. Movable capital income is subject to a 
tax rate ݐ௠௖, and capital gains to a rate of ݐ௖௚. It fulfills ݐ௖௚ ൑ ݐ௠௖ ൑ ݐ௚. Total taxable 
income of the individual i is ݖ ൌ ݖ௚ ൅ ݖ௠௖ ൅ ݖ௖௚. Individuals can, at some cost, shift 
income between the three types of income, guided by the lower taxation of movable 
capital income, and especially, of capital gains. 
The budget constraint of the individual i is the following: 
[1] ܿ ൌ ݖ െ ݐ௚൫ݖ௚ െ ܽଵ െ ܽଶ൯ െ ݐ௠௖ሺݖ௠௖ ൅ ܽଵ െ ܽଷሻ െ ݐ௖௚൫ݖ௖௚ ൅ ܽଶ ൅ ܽଷ൯ ൌ
ݖ௚൫1 െ ݐ௚൯ ൅ ݖ௠௖ሺ1 െ ݐ௠௖ሻ ൅ ݖ௖௚൫1 െ ݐ௖௚൯ ൅ ܽଵ൫ݐ௚ െ ݐ௠௖൯ ൅ ܽଶ൫ݐ௚ െ ݐ௖௚൯ ൅
ܽଷ൫ݐ௠௖ െ ݐ௖௚൯ 
Where c is consumption and ௝ܽ represents the amount of income shifted between the tax 
bases in response to the differences in tax rates, with j=1 denoting the strategy of 
shifting from ݖ௚  to ݖ௠௖ ; j=2, shifting from ݖ௚  to ݖ௖௚ ; and j=3, from ݖ௠௖  to ݖ௖௚ .The 
utility function of individual i is: 
[2] ݑ௜൫ܿ, ݖ, ௝ܽ൯ ൌ ܿ െ ߠ௚௜൫ݖ௚൯ െ ߠ௠௖௜ሺݖ௠௖ሻ െ ߠ௖௚௜൫ݖ௖௚൯ െ ∑ ߶௝௜ሺ ௝ܽሻଷ௝ୀଵ  
where ߠ∙௜ሺ∙ሻ is the cost of producing each type of taxable income, and ߶௝௜ሺ ௝ܽሻ is the cost 
of income shifting between types of income. Cost functions are convex and increasing 
in ݖ௚, ݖ௠௖, ݖ௖௚ and ௝ܽ, respectively.4 
The first-order conditions of the maximization problem for individual i are as follows:  
                                                            
3 See also Slemrod (2001) and Domínguez-Barrero and López-Laborda (2001). For a recent dynamic 
approach, see Saez and Stantcheva (2016). 
4 Slemrod (2001) and Domínguez-Barrero and López-Laborda (2001) consider that the cost of income 
shifting also depends inversely on the income obtained by the individual. Slemrod (2001) refers to this 
relationship as the “avoidance-facilitating” quality of true income. This assumption significantly alters the 
first-order conditions reflected in [3a], [3b] and [3c]. 
7 
 
[3a] 1 െ ݐ௚ ൌ ߠ௚௜ᇱ ൫ݖ௚൯ 
[3b] 1 െ ݐ௠௖ ൌ ߠ௠௖௜ᇱ ሺݖ௠௖ሻ 
[3c] 1 െ ݐ௖௚ ൌ ߠ௖௚௜ᇱ ൫ݖ௖௚൯ 
[4a] ݐ௚ െ ݐ௠௖ ൌ ߶ଵ௜ᇱ ሺܽଵሻ 
[4b] ݐ௚ െ ݐ௖௚ ൌ ߶ଶ௜ᇱ ሺܽଶሻ 
[4c] ݐ௠௖ െ ݐ௖௚ ൌ ߶ଷ௜ᇱ ሺܽଷሻ 
Equations [3a], [3b] and [3c] reflect that taxable income is an inverse function of tax 
rate. Equations [4a], [4b] and [4c] show that income shifting is an increasing function of 
tax rate differences. Consequently, movable capital income (capital gains) reported by 
an individual will depend on i) the own tax rate applied to this income, ii) the difference 
between the tax rate on movable capital income (capital gains) and the tax rate on 
general income, iii) the difference between the tax rate on movable capital income and 
the tax rate on capital gains, and iv) the cost of transforming one type of income into 
another. Based on this simple model, in the following sections we shall try to 
empirically test whether these strategies occurred in Spain in the period 1999-2009. 
 
3. The dual character of the Spanish PIT and taxpayers’ tax planning 
On 1 January 2007 a new reform of the PIT came into force in Spain which took further 
steps towards dualisation of the tax. Until that date, only capital gains generated in a 
period of over one year were taxed at a constant rate, which has varied with the 
successive tax reforms. 5  The remaining income was taxed under the general tax 
schedule, which has also undergone modifications over the years, in both the number of 
brackets and the minimum and maximum tax rate. In 2007, certain movable capital 
income came to be taxed at the same constant rate as capital gains generated in a period 
of over one year. In Table 1 we summarise the evolution of savings income taxation for 
1999-2009, which is the period for which we shall undertake the empirical analysis. 
                                                            
5  This constant tax rate in 1999 was higher than the minimum marginal rate of the general tax schedule. 
In 2000 and 2003 it was reduced and equated that minimum. In 2007 it was increased, but was fixed 
below the general minimum rate, which underwent a sharp increase. In 2010 it rose once more and was 
replaced by a schedule of few brackets of increasing rates which, although at first were lower than the 
minimum rate of the general schedule, by 2012 were greater.  
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Table 1:  Nominal tax rates for savings income in Spain, 1999-2009 (*) 
 Movable capital: 
Interests, dividends, 
insurance 
Movable capital: 
Other income  
Capital gains  
generated in less than 
Capital gains 
generated in more 
than  
1999 18-48% (6) 18-48% (6) 2 years:  18-48% (6) 2 years: 20% 
2000 18-48% (6) 18-48% (6) 1 year:   18-48% (6) 1 year: 18% 
2001 18-48% (6) 18-48% (6) 1 year:   18-48% (6) 1 year: 18% 
2002 18-48% (6) 18-48% (6) 1 year:   18-48% (6) 1 year: 18% 
2003 15-45% (5) 15-45% (5) 1 year:   15-45% (5) 1 year: 15% 
2004 15-45% (5) 15-45% (5) 1 year:   15-45% (5) 1 year: 15% 
2005 15-45% (5) 15-45% (5) 1 year:   15-45% (5) 1 year: 15% 
2006 15-45% (5) 15-45% (5) 1 year:   15-45% (5) 1 year: 15% 
2007 18% 24-43% (4) 18% 18% 
2008 18% 24-43% (4) 18% 18% 
2009 18% 24-43% (4) 18% 18% 
(*) Number of brackets of the tax schedule appears in parentheses. 
Source: by the authors. 
 
In 2007, capital gains generated in less than one year and movable capital income 
(dividends, interest and income from insurance and capitalisation operations), which 
until then had been taxed at the general tax schedule, came to be taxed at a constant rate 
of 18%. Only movable capital income derived from intellectual and industrial property, 
together with that from the provision of technical assistance, from the renting of 
movable property, businesses or mines, from subletting and from leasing image rights 
(to all of which we shall term “other income from movable capital”) continued to be 
taxed at the general tax schedule.6   
In this way, the 2007 reform proved harmful for all capital gains generated in over one 
year, since their tax rate was increased by three percentage points, from 15 to 18%. 
Regarding the general tax schedule, the maximum marginal tax rate was reduced by two 
                                                            
6 In 2013 and 2014 capital gains generated in less than one year reverted to forming part of the general 
taxable base, although since 2015 they have been again taxed as savings income. 
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percentage points, from 45% to 43%, but the minimum was raised by nine percentage 
points, from 15 to 24%.7 
Changes in tax rates introduced by the 2007 reform opened the way to greater 
possibilities for income shifting from the general to the savings base, for two reasons. 
First, there were more income sources which due to the reform came to be taxed at a 
constant tax rate, one lower than the minimum general tax rate. Second, the reform 
meant all taxpayers, whatever their income level, now had the option of undertaking 
such tax planning. Until then, taxpayers in the first bracket of the tax schedule had no 
incentive to adopt this strategy, since for them there was no difference between their 
marginal tax rate for general income and for savings. 8  As income rose, the gap 
progressively increased until it reached 30 percentage points for taxpayers in the highest 
brackets. In turn, after the reform, all taxpayers, including those in the lowest brackets, 
were able to benefit from the strategy of income shifting between tax bases, since the 
gap between the marginal tax rate for general income and that for savings ranged from 6 
percentage points for the lowest income taxpayers to 25 percentage points for the richest 
(table 1). 
Statistics published by the MINHAP show the size of the various components of the 
taxable base by income levels. This information shows that the weight of movable 
capital income and capital gains generated in over one year clearly increase with the 
taxpayer income. By way of illustration, Figure 1 presents data for the year 2006, 
although the same pattern is reproduced for any year of the period.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 The Autonomous Communities (Spanish regions) have powers to modify the general schedule that is 
applied in their territory, but until recently they have hardly used them. 
8 As shown in Table 1, in 1999 this gap was negative, by two percentage points, for the lowest income 
taxpayers, and reached 28 percentage points for the richest taxpayers. 
9 The figures for other years are available to the interested reader on request. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the taxable base by income brackets. Spanish PIT 2006 
 
 
 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration, from General Directorate of Taxes (2009:91-92). 
 
If we observe the evolution over time of the weights of the taxable base components, we 
can state that PIT taxpayers do indeed perform tax planning. Figure 2 shows that in the 
two years prior to the reform, the weight of movable capital income (black line) 
gradually increases, behind which there may be a strategic organisation of wealth, that 
is to say, anticipation by taxpayers of the imminent and generally favorable tax reform 
affecting this type of income, which was already known in 2005. However, such income 
acquired greater weight in 2007 and 2008, that is to say, once the favorable tax rate of 
18% was already in force, which appears to reveal a learning effect by taxpayers of the 
advantages of the reform. 
The behaviour varies according to income levels. Two years prior to the reform, 
movable capital income appears to lose weight in the richest taxpayers’ tax base. This 
fact may indicate that these taxpayers delayed the decision to report movable capital 
income and waited until this income received a much more favorable tax treatment from 
2007 onwards, which is when it gains a greater (and increasing) share in their total tax 
base. In the remaining income levels, movable capital income slightly increased its 
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presence in the two years prior to the reform, despite the fact that after it taxpayers 
would pay taxes at a constant and generally lower tax rate. This behaviour may suggest 
that taxpayers reorganised their assets before the reform. 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the weight of movable capital income in the tax base, by income 
brackets  
 
 
Source: By the authors, based on the General Directorate of Taxes’ statistical publications for 2004 to 
2009. 
 
With regard to capital gains, Figure 3 shows that in 2006, when the immediate increase 
in the taxation of capital gains generated in over one year (the most important in the tax 
base according to Figure 1) became known, capital gains increased their weight in the 
tax base (unbroken black line). According to the General Directorate of Taxes 
(2013:82), the underlying causes of this increase were on the one hand, the favorable 
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behaviour of the housing market and of the stock markets, and on the other, anticipation 
of the sale of investment funds to avoid the immediate tax increase of the 2007 reform. 
In contrast, the weight of capital gains in total income decreased in 2007, 2008 and 
2009 since, as we have seen, part of them were brought forward to the year prior to the 
reform, and additionally a lock-in effect could have occurred, in which capital gains 
were not realised during the period 2007-2009 probably due to the favorable taxation of 
dividends and interests from 2007 onwards. From then on, the poor behaviour of the 
housing and stock markets (General Directorate of Taxes, 2013: 82-3), as shown in the 
figure by broken lines, also played a role, although it became less significant over time. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of the weight of capital gains generated in over one year* 
 
*The information shown by the graph since the year 2007 also includes capital gains generated in up to one year, since the 
Taxpayers Panel of the IEF does not provide disaggregated information on capital gains by their period of generation, as all are 
taxed in the same way. In any case, capital gains generated in up to one year had very little weight until the year 2006, and would 
probably increase following the reform, due to more favorable tax treatment. The graph also shows the evolution of the IBEX-35 
and of the average price of second-hand housing. 
Source: By the authors, based on the General Directorate of Taxes’ statistical publications for the years 
2004 to 2009. 
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It appears, therefore, that taxpayers reacted to changes in the taxation of capital gains 
generated in over one year by modifying the timing of realisation – specifically, shifting 
it from the fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009 to the fiscal year 2006, due to more 
favorable taxation. By income brackets, the richest taxpayers brought forward capital 
gains to 2006 more often than lower income taxpayers, and for them the weight of 
capital gains also fell more sharply following the reform. 
 
4. Empirical approximation: specification and database 
In this section and the next, we shall econometrically test the hypothesis that the 
composition of the Spanish PIT taxpayers’ tax base is affected by the difference 
between general and savings income tax rates as well as between movable capital 
income and capital gains tax rates. As previously mentioned, the exercise will be 
performed using the IEF’s Spanish PIT Taxpayers Panel for the period 1999-2009. 
As seen in the third section, the treatment of the diverse savings income (movable 
capital and capital gains) has changed over time, such that only from 2007 onwards do 
they receive a unitary treatment; and, furthermore, the weight of each category of 
savings income in total income has evolved differently over time. Consequently, we 
shall estimate two separate models for movable capital income and capital gains in 
order to determine whether taxpayers display differentiated behaviour between the two 
types of income. The model to be estimated for movable capital income is the 
following: 
[5a] ܯ݋ݒܾ݈ܽ݁ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ܯ݋ݒܾ݈ܽ݁ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ௜௧ିଵ ൅  ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߛܼ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
And for capital gains: 
[5b] ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ݃ܽ݅݊ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅  ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߛܼ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧   
where Movablecapitalit is the weight of this income reported each year in the total 
taxable base, Capitalgainsit is the weight of  realised capital gains in the taxpayer’s total 
tax base , itX  are the variables of interest, and itZ  the control variables.   
Next, we describe in some detail the dependent and independent variables included in 
the above specifications. The description and the expected effect of each variable are 
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listed in Table A1.1 of Annex. Table A1.2 presents the main descriptive statistics of the 
variables. 
 
4.1. Endogenous variables 
We have taken as dependent variable the weight of movable capital income in the 
taxpayer’s total tax base (Movablecapital)10 on the one hand, and the weight of capital 
gains in total taxable income (Capitalgains)11 on the other. Our aim is to see whether 
taxpayers can reorganise their income so it is obtained as one of these two forms of 
savings income rather than as general income or the other type of savings income, or 
modify the time when they materialise this income, in response to a tax change. An 
increase in these endogenous variables could have happened without even varying 
savings income (due to a fall in general income), or by increasing both savings and 
general income (depending on the proportion in which each is performed). However we 
consider that these variables constitute a good proxy for the income shifting between 
bases which we wish to measure, since they capture the taxpayer´s tendency or 
resistance towards generating savings income, whether in the form of capital gains or 
movable capital, in lieu of other income. If the weight of savings income increases, 
logically that of other income must decrease. 
 
 
                                                            
10 Savings income derived from mobile capital includes all movable capital income, that is to say, not 
only dividends, interests and income derived from life insurance and capitalisation operations, which 
from 2007 onwards have been taxed at a constant tax rate; but also “other movable capital income” which 
has always been taxed in the general schedule because, until 2004, the Taxpayers Panel did not 
distinguish it from the remaining movable capital income. Although the amount of taxed dividends differs 
according to the mechanism employed to eliminate double taxation, we shall not take it into account 
when measuring tax rates, because in 2007 the full tax imputation system stopped being used as a 
corrective mechanism of the double taxation of dividends. This was replaced by the exemption system, 
which covered the first €1,500 obtained by the taxpayer. We do not take into account the movable capital 
income from the “Special Scheme for Attribution”, because the data are not available for 1999. We have 
also removed the observations for which movable capital income is negative, in order to avoid negative 
values for this variable. 
11 Savings income derived from capital gains includes all capital gains, independently of their origin 
(sales of properties or other), since until 2006 this disaggregation was unknown; and also independently 
of the time in which they were generated, since differentiation according to the time of generation is not 
always equal (1 or 2 years) and, furthermore, has been unknown since 2007. We do not discount 
compensations of capital losses from prior years, since we are trying to see whether the taxpayer decides 
to generate capital gains or other income types each year. We have removed the observations for which 
the capital gains are negative, with the objective of avoiding the dependent variable also being negative. 
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4.2. Explanatory variables 
As explanatory variables we have included, in addition to our interest variables, a set of 
control variables which are intended to reflect individuals’ observable characteristics 
and the time trend. Additionally, in the model which estimates movable capital income, 
the endogenous variable is lagged one period, in order to observe the dynamic pattern of 
taxpayers' behaviour, given that movable capital income reported in one year will also 
depend on the investment made in movable capital in previous years. However, in the 
model of capital gains the capital realised in one year will not depend on that realised in 
previous years. 
4.2.1 Variables of interest 
Marginal benefit from savings income 
The main explanatory interest variable is the marginal benefit derived from the 
reduction of taxation for savings income. The greater this marginal benefit, the more 
incentives individuals will have to undertake tax planning, increasing the weight of 
savings income in their total income. 
We must take into account that the marginal benefit derived from the reduction of 
taxation for savings income is different for capital gains and for movable capital 
income, and thus it must be defined and calculated differently. When we explain the 
weight of capital gains in the taxpayer’s total tax base, the marginal benefit derived 
from the reduction in taxation for capital gains is calculated for each taxpayer as the 
difference tgCG - tsCG. Defining tgCG as the marginal tax rate at which capital gains for 
each taxpayer would be taxed each year if they had been obtained as general income 
and were taxed, consequently, in the general tax schedule; and tsCG as the nominal tax 
rate at which capital gains generated in more than one year were taxed according to the 
regulations of each year.  
When we estimate the weight of movable capital income in the total tax base, we shall 
calculate the marginal benefit derived from the reduction of taxation for movable capital 
income for each taxpayer as the difference tgMC - tsMC. To do this, we have defined tgMC 
as the marginal tax rate at which movable capital income would be taxed each year for 
each taxpayer if it had been obtained as general income and taxed in the general tax 
schedule. tsMC is the marginal tax rate at which movable capital income is taxed 
according to the regulations of each year. As until the 2007 reform this income was 
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taxed in the general schedule, there was no tax incentive to shift income from the 
general base to movable capital income, the variable tgMC - tsMC therefore taking the 
value of zero.  
According to our theoretical model, there may also be incentives for the taxpayer to 
shift income between movable capital income and capital gains. For this reason, when 
we estimate the weight of capital gains in an individual’s total taxable income, we 
include as an explanatory variable the difference tsCGMC - tsCG, calculated for that 
individual. tsCGMC would be the tax rate applied to the individual’s capital gains if taxed 
as movable capital income, and tsCG the previously defined nominal rate for capital 
gains. The larger this difference, the greater the incentive for the taxpayer to change 
movable capital income to capital gains, and thus, the higher the value of the 
endogenous variable, Capitalgains.   
Similarly, when we explain the weight of movable capital income for each taxpayer, we 
could include the explanatory variable tsMCCG-tsMC, where tsMCCG is the tax rate applied to 
the individual’s movable capital income if taxed as capital gains and tsMC the real tax 
rate applied to their movable capital income, as defined above. However, we have not 
included this variable (tsMCCG-tsMC), due to its high correlation with (tgMC - tsMC).12 
Real response 
As our theoretical model also shows, the savings income reported each year depends on 
the tax rate on savings, so the model for estimating Capitalgains includes the variable 
tsCG, as previously defined. As the movable capital income reported in a given year 
really depends on the movable capital supplied that year and the previous years, it will 
also depend on the tax rate applied to that income that year and the previous years. For 
this reason, the model to estimate Movablecapital includes a variable tmsMC, which is 
the three-year moving average (the current year and the previous two years),13 of the tax 
rate applied to the individual’s movable capital income. 
To avoid endogeneity problems, all tax rates have been instrumented, as usual, using the 
income obtained by each taxpayer in 1999, the first year in the sample. 
 
                                                            
12 Correlations between variables can be seen in Table A1.3 of Annex. 
13 We have taken a three-year moving average so as not to lose too many observations. 
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Anticipation of the reform and learning 
We are also interested in identifying whether the taxpayers anticipated and learned from 
the 2007 reform, and, therefore, if they have shifted income over time, in response to 
that reform. We will approximate these anticipation and learning effects using some of 
the time dummy variables (year200t, with t=1,2…,8) we included in the model to 
capture the time fixed effects, which are the same for all individuals.  
In 2005 it was already known that movable capital income which consisted of 
dividends, interests and insurance income would come to be taxed at a constant tax rate 
from 2007 on, so a positive sign for the time dummies year2005 and year2006 could 
indicate that the taxpayers anticipated the tax reform and reorganised their assets to 
reduce the tax burden. It would also be reasonable that the anticipation effect of the 
reform to be higher in 2006, closer to the date of its coming into force, so the coefficient 
of year2006 should be greater than that of year2005. However, as it was not known 
until 2006 that capital gains generated over one year were to be taxed at three 
percentage points above their previous tax rate, this income could not have been shifted 
in 2005. Thus, in the case of capital gains, we only expect significant positive effects for 
the dummy year2006. 
Similarly, if taxpayers had been consistent with their planning strategies, the coming 
into force of the new tax rates should have significantly raised movable capital income, 
which had been especially favored since 2007, and reduced capital gains, either because 
they were brought forward and were realised in 2006, or because they were slowed 
down in the early years of the reform, given their comparatively less favorable taxation. 
We can approximate the measurement of these learning effects with the time dummies 
year2007 and year2008, expecting to obtain a positive coefficient for both when we 
estimate movable capital income, and a negative one when we estimate capital gains. 
Also, a greater coefficient for year2008 could be indicating that taxpayers did indeed 
learn from the reform and reacted to it more in 2008, by which time they would have 
been fully aware of the changes brought about by the reform already in force. It must be 
borne in mind that although the transparency of the tax measures is high, many 
taxpayers may not be aware of the tax changes until the time comes to file their tax 
return (or may even remain completely unaware of them). 
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4.2.2. Control variables 
Opportunity to plan 
We incorporate the “opportunity” for individuals to plan how to obtain their income as 
the first control variable. The empirical literature (Auerbach and Siegel, 2000; 
Daunfeldt et al., 2010; Saez et al., 2012, Jacob, 2014, and Alstadsæter and Jacob, 2016) 
shows that the richest taxpayers react most to tax changes. Furthermore, higher income 
taxpayers will have better access to tax planning techniques. For that reason, we have 
interacted taxpayer income (Income) with the tax rate difference variable, in order to see 
if, for a given tax rate difference, income shifting from the general base increases as 
income levels increase. The variable Income is constructed by adding the gross income 
from labor and movable and immovable capital, the net income from economic 
activities and imputed income. 
As in the literature, we also consider that self-employed and business owners have 
greater possibilities of performing tax planning strategies. They can decide, on the basis 
of taxation, to invest their profits in the same business, so they can then generate new 
profits which are taxed as income from economic activities in the general tax schedule, 
or to invest them in assets which generate savings income and which can be taxed at a 
lower rate. They can also finance an investment from external resources and deduct the 
financial expenses, thereby reducing their general taxable income, and use their own 
funds to invest in movable capital or in future capital gains, which will be taxed as 
savings income at lower rates. Consequently, and to capture this planning opportunity, 
we have constructed a dummy variable (Selfemployed) which takes the value of 1 if the 
taxpayer is self-employed or business owner and 0 otherwise, and interacted it with the 
tax rate difference variable, to see whether, for a given tax rate difference, the self-
employed and business owners shift more income from the general base to the savings 
base. We have also included the weight of income from self-employed and business 
owner in the taxpayer’s total income as an explanatory variable (WeightEA),14 in both 
the current and the previous fiscal year, since income reorganisation may not be 
immediate, but instead take some time.  
 
                                                            
14 We assign to this variable the value of 0 when that income is negative, to avoid the weight in total 
income also being negative. 
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Economic needs 
Other control variables which we have included in the econometric specifications refer 
to the economic burdens of the individual, since greater economic need can affect the 
individual’s savings income. As proxies of these economic burdens we have considered, 
on the one hand, family burden (Familyburden), which we have estimated from the 
personal and family amounts which are exempt from taxation (called minimums), 
including the minimums for descendants, ascendants and disability; and, on the other 
hand, the weight of the mortgage paid each fiscal year (Mortgageburden) in the 
taxpayer’s income, which we have estimated on the basis of the amount of the tax credit 
for investment in the main home.  
Other control variables 
We have also tried to test whether savings income differs by geographic zones, due to 
their different productive structure. We suggest the possibility that the great weight of 
the construction and tourist sectors in the Mediterranean coastal zone favors savings 
income. To test this, we have included a dummy variable (Mediterranean) which takes 
the value of 1 if the taxpayer lives in a province of the Mediterranean coast and 0 
otherwise; a positive effect is expected.  
Given that higher housing prices also influence both the amount of capital gains and 
decisions on when to realise them, we have included the evolution of the average price 
of second-hand homes in the country as a whole (Phousing) in the estimations of capital 
gains, lagged by one period to reflect the fact that house sales are not immediate. We 
expect a positive sign for this variable.  
Additionally, we have considered the age of the individual (Age) as an explanatory 
variable. According to the life cycle models of consumption and savings (Attanasio and 
Browning, 1995; Carroll, 1997; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Gomes and Mochaelides, 
2005; Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Attanasio and Weber, 2010; Daunfeldt et al., 2010), 
when individuals are young they tend to save as a precaution, faced with uncertain 
employment situations, and thus are less prone to realise capital gains. When they are 
mature they save for retirement age, and thus also tend not to generate such income. In 
turn, when they reach retirement age they consume the saved income, although they 
may wish to leave an inheritance, and it is then that capital gains are usually realised. 
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The expected effect of the age is then positive for capital gains and negative for 
movable capital income  
Lastly, we have also included in the model marital status (Status: married=1; single =0), 
gender (Gender: male=1; female=0), size of the municipality in which the taxpayer lives 
(Pop), and a trend variable (Trend), with a priori indeterminate signs. 
 
4.3. Database 
The database we shall use to undertake the analysis is the PIT Taxpayers Panel for the 
period 1999-2009, which was compiled by the IEF on the basis of PIT returns supplied 
by the State Tax Agency (AEAT) (Onrubia et al., 2011; Onrubia et al., 2012). It is an 
expanded panel, in which each annual sample is representative of the Spanish 
population filing a PIT return that year. More specifically, we have used the file called 
“principal”, where the unit of observation is the tax return. This lets us work with nearly 
a million observations. We have not included, therefore, the returns of spouses who pay 
tax individually (and are included in the “spouses” file), as we think they will contribute 
nothing to the investigation. Although spouses may redistribute income to each other to 
take advantage of separate taxation (López-Laborda and Zárate, 1999), this strategy is 
outside the scope of the present study. 
The panel is not balanced, since some taxpayers die and others cease filing returns 
because their income has dropped beneath the minimum income threshold to do so; this 
requires the selection of a suitable estimation technique for non-balanced panels. 
 
5. Estimation and results 
In accordance with conventional assumptions, the best unbiased linear estimators are 
those obtained when employing ordinary least squares, as long as the errors are 
independent of each other and are identically distributed with a constant variance. 
Unfortunately, these conditions are frequently violated with panel data: independence is 
not satisfied when errors of different units are correlated (cross-sectional dependence), 
or when errors within each unit are temporarily correlated (serial correlation), or the two 
cases occur simultaneously. Furthermore, spatial (or network) patterns are an 
econometric problem which is frequently ignored, although numerous studies of the 
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social effects caused by proximity or neighborhood have clearly established that the 
microdata bases exhibit complex patterns of mutual dependence between cross-sectional 
units. This is the main econometric problem facing an empirical exercise like ours, since 
the construction of income microdata bases according to geographical distribution is 
known to generate a problem of cross-sectional dependence.  Additionally, the 
“identical” distribution of errors does not hold when the variance is not constant 
(heteroskedasticity). In fact, as we will see further below, both problems are present in 
our model. 
Joint problems of contemporaneous correlation, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
can be simultaneously solved with Feasible Generalised Least Squares (Parks-Kmenta 
FGLS approach) or by employing Panel Corrected Standard Errors (Beck and Katz´s 
PCSE method), these methods do work well when the number of years in the sample is 
at least the same as that of the cross sections considered. 15  For this reason, the 
methodology proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998), which was developed and adapted 
to unbalanced panels by Hoechle (2007), is very useful, since it corrects the drawbacks 
of the previous estimators of the covariance matrix when the cross section dimension is 
large in relation to the temporal one, as in our case. 
We have checked the presence or absence of the aforementioned econometric problems 
in our estimations and found evidence of significant autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity problems (by way of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation and the 
modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity). Additionally, the CD test of Pesaran (2004) 
adapted by Hoechle (2007) to check if the residuals resulting from the estimations 
present cross-sectional correlation, allows us to conclude that there is a pattern of 
dependence in the residuals of the estimated equation.16 Therefore, it is necessary to 
estimate our model with the methodology proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and 
adapted to unbalanced panels by Hoechle (2007). This methodology can be used when 
residuals are non-spherical and it corrects the complex patterns of dependence of the 
perturbation without requiring the sample employed to present homoskedasticity and 
                                                            
15 See Beck and Katz (1995), Beck (2001), Tosun and Skidmore (2004) and Reed and Webb (2010). 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are more robust in the models estimated with Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors. Feasible Generalised Least Squares generates excessive levels of significance in 
statistical tests, especially in cases such as ours, when the number of individuals is high in relation to the 
time dimension of the sample.  
16 The Pesaran test yields values between 0.3 and 0.4, and thus it is unsurprising that the Pesaran test 
accepts the existence of cross-sectional dependence, for any level of significance considered. 
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serial and contemporary uncorrelation.17 Moreover, it can be used with a database like 
ours, since the necessary information is not available in all fiscal years and for all 
taxpayers. Working with an unbalanced panel allows us to maintain a sufficient number 
of observations to guarantee the representativeness of the sample.18 
Results from the models measuring income shifting to capital gains and to movable 
capital income are shown in Table 2. 19 Table 3 presents the elasticity of the variables of 
interest which have proved significant. 
Results show that, as expected from a theoretical point of view, taxpayers plan their 
income on the basis of the tax treatment it receives. Furthermore, total response of 
movable capital income to changes in the explanatory variables is greater than 
contemporaneous response, given that, as expected, tax planning presents inertial 
behaviour, because the lagged endogenous variable is significant and positive. This 
dynamic component, which captures the speed at which the endogenous variable 
(movable capital) is adjusted in response to changes in explanatory variables, is close to 
1 (0.75), showing that this income adjusts slowly, as the cost of being outside the 
desired position is small in comparison with the cost of adjustment.  
Estimates also indicate that the greater the marginal profit derived from the reduction of 
taxation for any type of savings income with regard to general income, the greater the 
weight of savings income in the total tax base, and consequently, the more income the 
taxpayer shifts from the general base to that of savings. The elasticities of Table 3 show 
that income shifting is especially sensitive to the tax rates wedge for capital gains (tgCG - 
tsCG). Faced with an increase of 100% in the differential of tax rates, the response of this 
income is 118.47%. However, the reaction is much lower (7.76% contemporaneous 
response and 31.29% total effect) for movable capital income. These results are in line 
with those obtained by Pirtilla and Selin (2011) and Harju and Matikka (2016a) for 
Finland, although due to the different nature of the Finnish reform they analyse, these 
                                                            
17  We also tested different dynamic panel data formulations, including the maximum verisimilitude 
approach, and taking logarithms; trying the model in differences; and considering different lags in the 
variables, although none of these approaches improved the results presented, or passed the Sargan test for 
instrumental variables or the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. 
18 We considered the possibility of including taxpayer fixed effects which capture the unobserved time-
invariant characteristics of the individuals. However, this procedure is incompatible with the use of 
weighting assigned to each taxpayer in the calculations to extrapolate the results to the population. 
19 We have also verified the significance of the set of proposed explanatory hypotheses (Wald test). 
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authors found this shifting effect only among the business owners, obtaining elasticities 
of around 150%. 
 
Table 2: Estimation of the income shifting model for savings income using the 
methodology of Driscoll-Kraay  
 Capitalgains Movablecapital 
 Coefficient Drisc/Kraay Std. Err 
Coefficient Drisc/Kraay
Std. Err 
Movablecapital t-1   0,7517*** 0,0207 
(tgCG - tsCG)t 0.1038*** 0.0324   
(tgCG - tsCG)t * Incomet 3.37e-07*** 3.92e-08   
(tgCG - tsCG)t * Selfemployedt 0.0759*** 0.0078   
(tgMC - tsMC)t   0.0521*** 0.0044 
(tgMC - tsMC)t  * Incomet   -9.52E-09 1.50E-08 
(tgMC - tsMC)t * 
Selfemployedt 
  0.0208*** 0,0026 
(tsCGMC-tsCG)t -0.0157  0.0397   
tsCGt 0.1096 0.1212  
tmsMCt  -0.0051 0.0080
Year2001 -0.2437*** 0.0101 0.6027*** 0.0745
Year2003 -0.1133 0.0869 0.1013*** 0.0544
Year2005 -0.0573 0.2006 0.2427*** 0.0368
Year2006 0.9512** 0.3464 0.5403*** 0.0394
Year2007 -0.7151*** 0.1516 0.1512*** 0.0399
Year2008 -1.4805*** 0.1554 0.9788*** 0.0238
WeightEAt -0.0737*** 0.0105 -0.0385*** 0.0070
WeightEAt-1 0.0503*** 0.0074 0.0342*** 0.0059
Mortgageburdent -0.0045 0.0055 -0.0102*** 0.0033
Familyburdent -0.0232 0.0210 -0.01632 0.0254
Aget 0.0550*** 0.0082 0.06198*** 0.0047
Gendert -0.4977*** 0.0812 -0.2877*** 0.0277
Statust -0.2123*** 0.0380 -0.1958*** 0.0159
Popt 0.0990** 0.0367 0.0338*** 0.0036
Mediterraneant -0.1258*** 0.0379 0.0507 0.0470
Phousingt-1 0.0085*** 0.0011   
Trend -1.2431*** 0.0713 -0.1292*** 0.0218
Constant -9.6110** 3.706 -1.0831*** 0.2159
Observations 977,763 603,565 
R2 0.04 0.63 
F  F( 22,9) = 7,030,916.79 F(21,8) = 965.97 
Root MSE 53.6737 36.68 
*** Significance at 1% and ** at 5%. 
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Table 3: Contemporaneous and total elasticities of the significant variables of interest (*)   
 Capital gains Movable capital 
tgCG - tsCG 1.1847 
  
tgMC - tsMC  0.0776 (0.3129) 
Year2005  0.2427 
Year2006 0.9512 0.5403 
Year2007 -0.7151 0.1512 
Year2008 -1.4805 0.9788 
(*) Total elasticity, derived from the dynamic component of the 
Movablecapital model, is presented in parentheses.  
 
In addition, when taxpayers have the opportunity to choose their income sources, they 
take advantage of that opportunity, because income shifting from general income to 
capital gains motivated by different tax rates (tgCG - tsCG) increases with taxpayer income 
(Income), and especially with the status of self-employed or business owner 
(selfemployed). Income shifting from general income to movable capital  is also more 
marked among the group of self-employed or business owners, although it does not 
depend on taxpayer income.20 The literature has also found a greater response among 
the business owners group (see Pirttila and Selin, 2011), although most studies are in 
fact designed to test whether this strategy is found among business owners, since they 
are the ones who can choose the form of their remuneration. (Kari, 1999; Fjaerli and 
Lun, 2001; Lindhe et al., 2002 and 2004, Alstadsaeter and Jacob, 2016, Harju and 
Matikka, 2016a and b). 
The results shown by the time dummies suggest that taxpayers anticipated the 2007 tax 
reform and brought forward the obtaining of movable capital income to 2005, the year 
when the change in its tax rate was announced. Also, the coefficient obtained for the 
variable year2006 is, as expected, greater than for year2005, which would indicate that 
movable capital income was brought forward to 2005 and, above all, to 2006, the year 
before the reform. Capital gains were only brought forward to 2006, when the capital 
gains reform was announced, as shown by Year2006.  
                                                            
20 In the Capitalgains model we also interacted the differential of tax rates on savings income, tsCGMC-tsCG, 
with the variables Income and Selfemployed, to test whether the highest-income individuals and self-
employed or business owners are the groups shifting the most income from movable capital to capital 
gains. The results, which can be supplied on request, support that hypothesis, although the response of the 
highest-income individuals is significant only at 8%. 
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In the same way, and in accordance with their planning strategy, once the 2007 reform 
came into force, taxpayers increased the weight of their movable capital income, which 
benefited from the reform, and reduced the weight of capital gains, which would be 
taxed more heavily. These results are supported by the positive sign of year2007 and 
year2008 in the estimation of movable capital income and the negative sign of these 
variables in that of capital gains. Similar behaviour was obtained in Chetty and Saez 
(2005) and Kari et al (2008), for dividend payments; and Dai et al. (2008), Daunfeldt et 
al. (2010), and Jacob (2012), for capital gains. Also, the coefficient we obtained for the 
variable year2008 is, as expected, well above that for year2007, due to the learning 
effect we were trying to capture. Of course, these time dummies might also be capturing 
other time effects, in addition to the anticipation and learning effects which we are 
interested in. 
The own tax rate of each form of savings income (tsCG and tmsMC) is not significant in 
every model, so that taxpayers do not change their reported capital gains or movable 
capital when its tax rate changes. In line with the interpretation of Harju and Matikka 
(2016a), our results suggest there would not be a real response by Spanish taxpayers. 
They would only respond to changes in the differentials of the tax rates. Therefore, all 
the response would be income shifting. 
As Table 2 shows, control variables contribute, in general, to explain the reporting of 
savings income. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The literature has studied different kinds of tax avoidance or tax planning responses 
which taxes may induce in economic agents: income shifting over time, between tax 
bases or between taxpayers, readjustments in financial transactions, etc. In personal 
income taxation, dual taxes, which tax savings income at lower rates than general 
income, encourage an income shifting strategy which has hardly been studied by the 
applied literature. In the Spanish PIT, the difference in rates at which income can be 
taxed, depending on whether it is obtained as general or savings income, means that 
taxpayers are encouraged to shift part of their revenues from the general base to that of 
savings, to take advantage of that more favorable taxation. In the same way, the 
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different tax treatment received by capital gains and movable capital can encourage 
income shifting between both types of savings income. 
Based on a model of behavioural response to taxes, and using the Taxpayers Panel of 
the Institute of Fiscal Studies for the period 1999-2009, in this paper we have tested 
whether these tax strategies occurred in Spain, where there has traditionally been a 
favorable tax treatment of capital gains, which was extended from 2007 to the more 
important savings income, such as dividends and interests. Our results confirm that 
Spanish taxpayers plan the composition of their taxable base according to the taxation 
of each income source, and that self-employed or business owners and higher-income 
individuals make the greatest use of these tax planning strategies. The estimates also 
indicate that taxpayers shift income over time according to its taxation. 
The strategies detected in this paper, like other behavioural responses motivated by 
taxes, generate inefficiencies and erode the progressivity of the tax system and revenue 
collection, and thus they must be taken into account when designing taxes. When 
calculating the optimal tax for labor and capital income, Piketty and Saez (2013)  
consider (in addition to the redistributive objectives of society) the possibility which 
taxpayers have to shift earned income into capital income; the greater is the possibility 
of income shifting (“shifting elasticity”), the closer will be the optimal tax rates for both 
income types. Although far from the dual tax model, another proposal that limits the 
opportunities of income shifting is the one contained in the Mirrlees Review (Mirrlees 
et al., 2010), involving a zero tax rate on the normal return on capital and the taxation of 
excess returns at the same tax rates as other income. 
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ANNEX  
Table A1.1: Definition of variables and their expected sign 
VARIABLE DEFINITION EXPECTED SIGN 
Endogenous 
Capitalgains Capital Gains/Total taxable income  
Movablecapital Movable Capital Income/Total taxable income  
 Marginal benefit from savings income (tax rate wedge) 
tgCG-tsCG Taxpayer marginal benefit derived from the 
reduction in taxation for capital gains with respect 
to general income 
+ 
tgMC-tsMC Taxpayer marginal benefit derived from the 
reduction in taxation for movable capital with 
respect to general income 
+ 
tsCGMC-tsCG 
Taxpayer marginal benefit derived from the 
reduction in taxation for capital gains with respect 
to movable capital income 
+ 
tsMCCG-tsMC 
Taxpayer marginal benefit derived from the 
reduction in taxation for movable capital with 
respect to capital gains 
¿? 
Real response 
tsCG 
Nominal tax rate at which capital gains generated in 
more than one year are taxed according to the 
regulations of each year 
- 
tmgMC Tax rate of movable capital income: three-year moving average 
- 
Anticipation of the reform 
Year2005 = 1 in 2005, = 0 the rest + 
Year2006 = 1 in 2006, = 0 the rest + 
Learning 
Year2007 = 1 in 2007, = 0 the rest + for Movablecapital 
- for Capitalgains Year2008 = 1 in 2008, = 0 the rest 
Opportunity to plan 
Income Gross income from labor and movable and 
immovable capital + net returns from economic 
activities + income imputations + capital gains
+ 
Selfemployed = 1 if self-employed or business owner, = 0 
otherwise 
+ 
WeightEA = Income from economic activities/Income + 
Economic needs 
Familyburden Estimated family burdens ? 
Mortgageburden Annual mortgage (estimated on the basis of the 
panel) / Income  
? 
Other control variables 
Age Age of the individual - for Movablecapital  
+ for Capitalgains 
Status = 1 if married, = 0 otherwise ? 
Gender = 1 if male, = 0 if female ? 
Pop = 0 if municipality ≤ 50,000 inhabitants 
= 1  if 50,000 < municipality ≤ 100,000 inhabitants 
= 2  if 100,000 < municipality ≤ 500,000 
inhabitants 
= 3  if municipality > 1.000,000 inhabitants 
? 
Mediterranean = 1 if province on Mediterranean coast, = 0 
otherwise 
+ 
Phousing Average price of second-hand homes in the country 
as a whole 
+ for Capitalgains  
Trend = 1 in 1999, = 2 in 2000; … = 11 in 2009 ? 
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Table A1.2. Descriptive statistics  
 
 Mean 
Standard 
Error [95% Conf. Interval] 
Capitalgains 2.8178 0.0129 2.7925 2.8431 
Movablecapital 7.1661 0.0194 7.1281 7.2042 
tgCG - tsCG 16.0278 0.0080 16.0121 16.0436 
tgMC - tsMC 7.71098 0.0103 7.6907 7.7311 
tsCGMC-tsCG 8.3259 0.0128 8.3006 8.3511 
tsMCCG-tsMC -8.3880 0.0129 -8.4133 -8.3627 
tsCG 17.4421 0.0014 17.4392 17.4450 
tmsMC 27.3197 0.0112 27.2976 27.3419 
Income 84,547.1700 599.2184 83,372.7200 85,721.6200 
WeightEA 4.3001 0.0194 4.2620 4.3381 
Mortgageburden 5.1263 0.0173 5.0924 5.1603 
Familyburden 1.3270 0.0016 1.3237 1.3303 
Age 53.5907 0.0178 53.5557 53.6257 
Gender 0.7216 0.0005 0.7204 0.7227 
Status 0.7462 0.0005 0.7451 0.7473 
Pop 1.3394 0.0015 1.3363 1.3425 
Mediterranean 0.4724 0.0006 0.4712 0.4737 
Phousing 1,888.6310 0.4082 1,887.8300 1,889.4310 
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Table A1.3 Correlations 
tgCG	‐	tsCG	 tsCGMC‐tsCG	 	tgCG	 tgMC	‐	tsMC tsMCCG‐tsMC tmsMC	 Incomet	 Selfemployed WeightEA Mortgageburden Familyburden Age	 Gender	 Status	 Pop	 Mediterranean Phousing	
tgCG	‐	tsCG	 1.0000   
tsCGMC‐tsCG	 0.6030 1.0000  
tgCG	 -0.2687 -0.5308 1.0000 
tgMC	‐	tsMC	 0.0243 -0.7805 0.4545 1.0000
tsMCCG‐tsMC	 -0.5893 -0.9943 0.5127 0.7841 1.0000
tmsMC	 0.6615 0.9130 -0.3851 -0.6253 -0.9161 1.0000
Incomet	 0.1751 0.0799 -0.0224 0.0367 -0.0797 0.1047 1.0000
Selfemployed	 0.0370 -0.0052 0.0130 0.0353 0.0057 -0.0033 0.0216 1.0000
WeightEA	 0.0374 -0.0081 0.0075 0.0391 0.0082 -0.0064 0.0177 0.6071 1.0000
Mortgageburden	 -0.1048 0.0128 -0.0074 -0.0985 -0.0165 -0.0040 -0.0356 -0.0461 -0.0016 1.0000
Familyburden	 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0380 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0074 0.0007 0.0088 0.0181 -0.0360 1.0000
Age	 0.1242 -0.0435 -0.0157 0.1536 0.0545 -0.0322 0.0248 0.0724 0.0163 -0.2758 0.0825 1.0000
Gender	 0.1407 0.0415 -0.0006 0.0569 -0.0446 0.0656 0.0253 0.0995 0.0569 -0.0428 0.0103 0.0235 1.0000
Status	 0.0788 0.0122 0.0112 0.0455 -0.0139 0.0271 0.0123 0.0549 0.0354 -0.0474 0.1555 -0.0103 0.3032 1.0000
Pop	 0.2220 0.1129 -0.0228 0.0327 -0.1103 0.1400 0.0571 -0.1167 -0.0667 -0.0282 -0.0131 0.0664 -0.0633 -0.0654 1.0000
Mediterranean	 -0.0203 -0.0065 0.0030 -0.0077 0.0061 -0.0097 -0.0074 -0.0154 -0.0094 0.0150 -0.0011 -0.0347 -0.0146 -0.0102 -0.1005 1.0000
Phousing	 -0.1124 -0.5449 -0.2098 0.5946 0.5502 -0.4628 0.0028 0.0125 0.0169 -0.0794 0.0597 0.1481 0.0042 0.0148 -0.0325 -0.0076 1.0000 
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